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THE FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL PLEADING'
ROBERT W. MILLAR
2
In the United States the scope and content of the indictment have
been determined by two general factors: first, the rule to be found in
all our constitutions to the effect that the accused shall be fully in-
-formed of the accusation against him, and secondly, the rule of judicial
law that the accusation shall express all the constituent elements of
the offense charged. Sometimes, naturally, these two requirements
coincide: full information to the accused is impossible without a state-
ment of all the constituent elements of the crime. But sometimes,
again, there is no such coincidence: a given constituent element of the
offense may be of no conceivable utility in conveying information to
the accused. Thus in 'a prosecution for statutory rape, where to be
convicted, the offender must have attained a designated age, as in
Illinois, the age of seventeen years, the fact that the defendant has
attained the age in question is necessarily one of the essential elements
of the crime. It would be absurd to suppose that the defendant
-requires to be informed of his own age. Nevertheless, under the
second of the above requirements, where that is logically applied, an
indictment which failed to state the fact in question would not support
a conviction.
3
The suggestion that the second requirement should be abandoned
has been frequently made by writers on procedural reform. Such
abandonment has, in fact, taken place in England, where it is provided
by the rules adopted under the Indictments Act of 1915 that "the state-
ment of offense shall describe the offense shortly in ordinary language,
-avoidiitg,-as far as possible, the use of technical terms, and without
necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offense."4
In the report of the Institute's Committee on Criminal Procedure
for 1910-11 it was recommended, inter alia, that "the office of an indict-
ment or information should be (1) to give the accused notice of the
crime with which he is charged and of the case on the facts which will
be made against him, (2) to set out the facts constituting the alleged
'A paper read before the annual meeting of the American Institute of
Criminal Law and Criminology, at Cincinnati, Ohio, November 18, 1921.
2Professor of Law in Northwestern University.
3Millar, Reform of Criminal Pleading in Illinois, journal of Criminal Law
and Criminology, Vol. 8, p. 341.
4Rule 4-(1).
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offense, with sufficient exactness to support a plea of former conviction
or former acquittal, as the case may be. The further office of provid-
ing a formal basis for the judgment of conviction, so that the indict-
ment or information must set forth everything which is necessary to a:
complete case on paper no longer serves any useful end, produces
miscarriages of justice and should be done away with."r,
It may be a question whether the clause "to set forth the facts
0 * with sufficient exactness to support a plea of former convic-
tion or acquittal," etc., is here advisable. In some measure, at least, it
is at variance with the concluding part of the recommendation. To be
sufficient (that is, of itself) to support a plea of former conviction or
acquittal, must not the statement be of all the essential elements of the
offense? And when you thus require that all the elements be stated,
what have you but the "formal basis for the judgment of conviction"
which the concluding part of the recommendation proposes to do away
with? In truth, the suggestion here contained goes beyond what the
positive law, in its strictest mood, has ever demanded. There n&ver
has been a time, we may venture to say, when the statements of an
indictment had to be self-sufficing for the support of a plea of, former
jeopardy. Suppose X be indicted, by two separate indictments, for two
distinct acts of larceny, in respect of like articles, committed on dif-
ferent days. Under the rule that the prosecution, in its proof, is not
confined to the precise day alleged, it is possible, and has been from
the earliest times, for the two indictments to be in identical language,
including identity in the statement of dates, and yet support the two
convictions if the offenses be in fact distinct. If they be in fact dis-
tinct, no one would urge that X's conviction under the first is a bar to
the second indictment, in spite of the identity of averment. The rule
is about as well settled as any rule can be that parol evidence is ad-
missible on the question of the identity of the two offenses. And this
rule forms an abundant safeguard to the acquitted or convicted de-
fendant against later prosecution for the same offense. It is, therefore:
submitted that we may lay out of view the furnishing of protection in
this regard as a primary function of the indictment. An incidental
function it necessarily is, for the indictment in giving the defendant
notice of what is to be urged agaitist him necessarily will lay a basis,
though not imperatively a complete one, for any subsequent plea of
former jeopardy. The primary function of the indictment is mani-
festly that of complying with the just command of the Constitution
5journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 1, p 587.
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that it inform the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.
To perform this function it must either in itself or by proper sup-
plementation fully apprise the accused of the case to be proved against
him so that he may intelligently prepare his defense. Questions neces-
sarily arise (wholly apart from that of the constituent elements of the
offense) as to whether a given statement is sufficiently full to furnish
the accused the necessary information. Every such question should
be raised in advance of trial; the possibility of reserving such a ques-
tion until after it is too late to remedy the fault, if there be one, should
be cut down as far as possible. And here, it is submitted, any adequate
scheme of reformation should lay hold of the ingenious device em-
bodied in the present Massachusetts act, as well as in the draft code
presented by the Institute's Committee on Criminal Procedure for
1914-15.' That device is to permit the indictment itself to be in general
terms and to require the defendant, if he desires further information,
as he may be entitled to under the constitutional provision, to apply for
a bill of particulars. If he fails to make such application, he cannot
later object to the generality of the indictment. If he does make the
application, then the prosecution is compelled to furnish him with sup-
plemental information, by way of bill of particulars, to the full extent
of the constitutional requirement. In this plan is provided an effective
means of lessening the number of purely artificial objections to the
indictment. It is obviously not intended, in the least, to trench upon
the defendant's right of information, but merely to regulate it and
prevent it from being made the instrument of non-meritorious attack.
The English rules, to which reference has already been made,
afford a further suggestion. They require that "if the offense charged
is one created by statute", the statement "shall contain a reference to
the section of the statute creating the offense."7 This is a feature, too,
of the Italian and German systems, where the atto d'accusa in the one
case," and the Atnklage in the other,9 must specify the statute under
which the prosecution is being had. It is a matter of interest also to
note that this same thing was one of the desiderata in the system of
civil pleading proposed by Jeremy Bentham. On the assumption of a
codified law he requires that the plaintiff's demand contain "reference
to the article or articles * * * of the body of the law upon which
his demand is grounded."' 0
6Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 5, y. 827.
7Rule 4-(1).
8Codice di Procedura Penale, Art. 288.
9Strafprozessordnieng, § 198.
IORationale of Judicial Evidence, Bentham's Works, Vol. 7, p. 271.
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There can be no doubt that in many cases a knowledge of the
particular statute relied upon by the prosecution is as important an aid
to the intelligent preparation of a defense as a knowledge of the facts
intended to be proved. The growing complexity of statutory law is
such that in all fairness to the defendant the notice here implied ought
to take the place of the barren formula "against the form of the statute
in such case made and provided."
In any remodeling of our criminal procedure, equality of position
in the trial of the case, as between prosecution and defense, should be
steadfastly maintained. And to that end the state, it is submitted,
should have exactly the same advantage in respect of antecedent notice
of the facts to be proved by the other side as is accorded the defendant.
In other words, the defendant should be required to state the defense
upon which he relies in the same manner, as near as may be, as the
prosecution has been obliged to state the charge. Of course the con-
ditions are not the same in the two cases; the ordinary defense is a
"downright no"--that the defendant did not do the act complained of.
But if some special state of facts is relied upon to substantiate the
denial, as in the case of an alibi, it would seem proper that the state
be given notice thereof by written specification, under the plea of not
guilty or otherwise. And any defense which involves an admission of
the fact charged, such as former jeopardy or the statute of limitations
should be made the subject of a special plea. The function of the
defensive statement, whatever its form, should, like that of the indict-
ment, be the furnishing of necessary information to the opposite party.
Any special plea should be required to state the elements of a defense
only so far as coincident with the giving of such information. And,
like the indictment, such special plea should be permitted to be made in
general terms, with the right vested in the opposite party to demand
further particulars of the defense as a condition precedent to assailing
the validity of the pleading. It would also be open to the prosecution
to demand further particulars of a specification under not guilty and to
obtain such particulars if, in the opinion of the court, they are necessary
to impart proper information of the defense.
The same stressing of the idea of equality between the state and
the defendant in the presentation of the case leads us even further.
Under the existing law in most jurisdictions the prosecution is required
to furnish the defendant with a list of the witnesses to be called on
behalf of the state. This list, says Mr. Bishop, "is differently regarded
according to the terms of the varying statutes. Under some the prose-
cuting attorney must either examine all or have all in court to be called
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by the defendant if he wishes. Widely, he is not required to produce
all on the witness stand. On this sort of question, opinions as well as
statutes are not quite uniform. A witness not named in the list may,
in most localities, testify, as of favor or of right, either by having his
name first added to the list or without; but there are exceptional states
in which this is not allowed.""- In Illinois such a list must be given
as a matter of course in cases of felony and upon request in all other
cases.12 It ir there held that it is within the discretion of the court to
permit the calling of a witness not named in the list and that the exer-
cise of such discretion will not be reviewed except in case of surprise,
the burden of showing which rests upon the defendant. 3 The fur-
nishing of such a list should be an essential feature of any system of
criminal procedure. The requirement as it stands, however, should be
extended to include the furnishing to the defendant, where that is pos-
sible, of copies of documentary evidence intended to be relied on by
the prosecution. Thus, with the information supplied by the indict-
ment and particulars, if any, the defendant will have complete knowl-
edge of what is to be advanced against him. But all the cards are not
yet upon the table. Ought not the state to be advised to the same
extent as to the case of the defendant? It is a dramatic moment in a'
criminal trial when the defendant unexpectedly produces a witness who
testifies, say, that he saw a man, not the defendant, steal out of the
victim's house on the night of the murder. The jury lean forward in
rapt attention; the spectators are shivering with the thrill. What will
the prosecution do? is the question on everyone's lips. Counsel for the
prb6ectition whisper excitedly. * * * Perhaps they succeed in im-
peaching the witness; as likely as not they are helpless. Such a moment
can never be other than dramatic, but it has no place in a disinterested
search for the truth. We may well afford to lose the spectacle in the
consciousness of accomplished justice., Forewarning the prosecution
of the production of such a witness would have accomplished the result
of enabling it, by impeachment or otherwise, to meet his testimony, if
this was found to be false. On the other hand, if, upon investigation,
the state was convinced of its truth, the advance notice in question
might well be the means of saving the expense of a trial.
Accordingly, it would seem that some workable method could be
devised whereby the present duty of the prosecutor to furnish the
defendant with a list of, the prosecution's witnesses could be extended
and made bilateral, in such wise that the names of all the witnesses,
"Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, 4th ed., Vol. I, § 966c.
12 Crim. Code, § 1,.Div. VIII.
13People v. Strosnider, 264 Ill. 434.
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with a brief indication of the subject of their testimony, together with
copies of all documents to be used in evidence, should be mutually
communicated in advance of trial. So far as the state had prepared
its case at the time of the return of the indictment, so far as the accused
had prepared his defense at the time of pleading, the names of the
witnesses, with the above mentioned indication of their testimony and
the copies of the documentary evidence could be contained in a schedule
annexed to the indictment and pleas respectively. Any evidence to be
introduced in rebuttal could be similarly designated in what we might
call a replicatory schedule. Moreover, as any further evidence came to
light, down to the eve of trial, it could be similarly communicated by
supplemental schedule. In case the documentary evidence was too
bulky to permit of copies being furnished, an offer of submission to
inspection would take the place of such copies. In all cases notifica-
tion in the manner suggested would be a condition precedent to the
introduction of the evidence, leaving always some room for the exercise
of the judicial discretion.
Possibly such a plan might break down when put to a practical
test. But this is by no means certain, for, as already noted, a consider-
able fraction of it is in operation today. If it is feasible it would
eliminate wholly, from criminal trials, the element of surprise and
correspondingly minimize the element of chance. And apart from the
direct object which it is intended to accomplish-that of giving each
side notice of the other's evidence-it is not at all unlikely that it will
incidentally tend to bring about, on the part of each side, an earlier
and closer attention to its own evidence than perhaps is now generally
the case and, from this direction also, contribute to the production of a
more trustworthy basis for verdict and' judgment.
To sum up, therefore, the true function of criminal pleading is
manifestly that of giving each side adequate information of what it is
to be called upon to meet at the trial. The pleadings should be deemed
sufficient when they give such information without reference to the
legal elements of the charge or the defense save as these necessarily
appear in the fulfilment of the function stated. And provided that the
indictment or pleas state in general terms, to be regulated by statute,
the charge or defense, their failure to give all the necessary informa-
tion should be ground only for a preliminary motion on the part of
either side to be satisfied by supplementing the pleadings with bills of
particulars. Moreover, as ancillary to the pleadings in the discharge
of the function in question, there would appear to be room for a system
of mutual notice as to the evidence to be relied on at the trial. If such
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a system is practical, then by these means the prosecution and defense
may come to trial, each knowing the case of the other and prepared at
all points to subject that case to such thorough sifting that the truth
will seldom fail of ascertainment.
